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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue before the en banc court in this case is 
whether the appellant Reginald D. McGlory received 
constitutionally adequate notice for the administrative 
forfeiture of certain property seized by officers of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). 
 
McGlory was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to 
life imprisonment for various drug and firearm offenses. 
Incident to his arrest various of his property was seized and 
most of the seized property, but apparently not all, was 
subjected to administrative or judicial forfeiture by the 
DEA. McGlory first challenged the forfeiture byfiling a 
motion for return of property pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Before we can 
consider the adequacy of the particular administrative 
forfeiture notices that are the subject of this appeal,1 we 
must decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction to 
consider McGlory's Rule 41(e) motion. Only if it had can we 
consider the important, albeit narrow, issue whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Also before the en banc court are consolidated appeals in United 
States v. One Toshiba Color Television, Two Answering Machines, and 
One Health Tech Computer, No. 98-3578, and United States v. Assorted 
Jewelry, No. 98-3579. Although those appeals involve the identical 
parties and similar fact patterns as the present appeal, they raise 
distinct legal issues and will be addressed hereafter in a separate 
opinion. 
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adequate notice of administrative forfeiture proceedings is 
provided to a prisoner who is in local detention facilities by 
mailing the notices to an office of the United States 
Marshals Service. 
 
I. 
 
On September 8, 1989, DEA agents and local Pittsburgh 
officers arrested McGlory for conspiracy to possess heroin 
with intent to distribute. At that time, and pursuant to 
search warrants, the officers seized property, including 
cash, from McGlory's apartment at 236 South Negley 
Avenue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, his mother's home at 
4267 Bryn Mawr Road in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and his 
wife's residence at 285 Suncrest Drive in Verona, 
Pennsylvania. On September 15, 1989, the Magistrate 
Judge ordered that McGlory be detained by the United 
States Marshals Service pending trial. By arrangement 
between federal and state authorities, federal pretrial 
detainees are often housed in state detention facilities. 
 
McGlory was indicted by a federal grand jury on October 
4, 1989. He was charged with possession of a firearm after 
having been convicted of a felony, conspiracy to distribute 
heroin, and possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 
McGlory pled not guilty, and the court ordered a trial by 
jury to begin December 11, 1989, which was later 
continued to February 20, 1990. 
 
On December 13, 1989, the government filed a 
superseding indictment which added additional criminal 
charges against McGlory. McGlory was arraigned on the 
superseding indictment on December 21, 1989. He again 
pled not guilty to each charge. McGlory's trial began on 
April 25, 1990. On May 16, 1990, the jury returned its 
verdict finding McGlory guilty of each of the charges set 
forth in the superseding indictment. 
 
McGlory was sentenced on February 11, 1991 and was 
remanded to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons less than 
two weeks later. He therefore remained in the custody of 
the United States Marshals Service from the date of his 
arrest on September 8, 1989 until February 22, 1991, 
almost all of that time as a pretrial detainee. McGlory has 
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stated that during this time he was housed in various 
pretrial detention facilities, but neither he nor the 
government introduced evidence of the facilities in which he 
was confined or the dates of his confinement at each 
facility. This court has reviewed the record of McGlory's 
criminal trial and finds references to McGlory's initial 
detention on September 11, 1989 and thereafter on 
December 11, 1989 in Hancock County Jail, West Virginia, 
which suggests that he was detained there during that 
period. This encompasses the relevant period for the 
purpose of this appeal. We note other references that 
suggest that from approximately May 18, 1990 until at 
least August 2, 1990 he was housed in Fayette County Jail, 
Uniontown, Pennsylvania. By November 9, 1990, he had 
been moved to the Ohio County Jail in Wheeling, West 
Virginia. Since February 22, 1991, he has been in a federal 
prison designated by the Bureau of Prisons serving his term 
of life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. S 3621(a) and (b). 
 
Before McGlory's criminal trial began, and during the 
time McGlory was in the custody of the United States 
Marshals Service, the DEA initiated administrative 
forfeiture proceedings regarding the property covered by 
DEA seizure numbers 52425 ($8,800 cash), 65613 
(assorted clothing), 65615 (Louis Vuitton luggage), 2 66651 
(Louis Vuitton luggage/briefcase), 65323 (miscellaneous 
jewelry), and 67065 (cellular phone).3  
 
The DEA provided notice of these administrative 
forfeiture proceedings by three methods. One was by 
published notice in a newspaper of general circulation. The 
DEA also sent notice by certified mail, return receipt 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The luggage is misnamed throughout the record as Louis Vitton. The 
brand name is well known and the accurate name is Louis Vuitton. 
 
3. The government also initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings 
regarding eleven other DEA seizure numbers: 64582, 68735, 73402, 
68730, 68719, 68727, 64563, 68740, 68729, 68743, and 72090. The 
government contends that the property listed at these seizure numbers 
was seized from individuals other than McGlory, and McGlory does not 
contend otherwise in this appeal. In addition, one other administrative 
forfeiture (66645) involved a Nissan automobile that has been returned 
to the lienholder, and McGlory did not list this among the seizure 
numbers challenged on appeal. See Appellant's Brief at 4. 
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requested, to McGlory's last known address at 236 S. 
Negley Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and his mother's 
residence at 4267 Bryn Mawr Road, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. Finally, the DEA sent notice by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, addressed to McGlory to or in care 
of the United States Marshals Service at the federal 
courthouse located at 7th and Grant Street, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. Those notices were mailed between 
September 26, 1989 and November 15, 1989. McGlory 
claims that he received none of these notices. The 
government has made no attempt to show otherwise. 
 
McGlory did not take steps for the return of the property 
seized until April 11, 1994 when he filed a pro se motion 
under Rule 41(e) for the return of the seized property. This 
was after the completion of the criminal trial proceedings 
on February 11, 1991. On February 3, 1995, the District 
Court referred McGlory's Rule 41(e) motion for the return of 
the seized property to a Magistrate Judge for a report and 
recommendation. While the matter was pending, this court 
decided United States v. $184,505.01 In U.S. Currency, 72 
F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995), another challenge by McGlory to 
different forfeitures, where we held that the notice given to 
McGlory in two of three judicial forfeiture proceedings did 
not satisfy due process. On December 17, 1996, the 
Magistrate Judge filed his report recommending that 
McGlory's Rule 41(e) motion be denied without prejudice to 
the judicial forfeiture actions. On December 30, 1996, 
before the District Court ruled on the Report and 
Recommendation, McGlory's counsel filed a motion for 
permission to file an amended Rule 41(e) motion and to 
stay any further proceedings on McGlory's pro se Rule 41(e) 
motion. 
 
On January 3, 1997, the District Court determined that 
the Magistrate Judge "correctly denied the Rule 41(e) 
motion" and ordered that "the plaintiff 's Rule 41(e) motion 
is dismissed without prejudice to the pending civil forfeiture 
actions." United States v. McGlory, No. 89-144, Slip op. at 
1, 4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1997). The court opined that "[t]he 
administrative forfeiture proceedings did not suffer from the 
same defective notice problem as the judicial forfeiture 
proceedings, see United States v. $184,505.01 In U.S. 
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Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995), since petitioner was 
personally served with notice of those actions." Id. at 2 
(emphasis added). The court did not explain what 
constituted the "personal service" on McGlory to which it 
referred, nor did it expressly rule on McGlory's motion to 
file an amended Rule 41(e) motion. 
 
On January 13, 1997, McGlory, through counsel, filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the January 3, 1997 order 
denying his Rule 41(e) motion. On January 14, 1997, he 
filed a notice of appeal from that same order without 
waiting for any order from the District Court. We stayed the 
appeal pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, 
which the District Court denied on September 22, 1998, 
when it also adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and 
Recommendation on a wide range of issues relating to the 
forfeitures. Both parties assume that we have jurisdiction 
to review the District Court's order of September 22, 1998. 
We do not. McGlory only appealed the January 3, 1997 
order. 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically 
refer to a motion to reconsider but such motions, iffiled 
within ten days of judgment, are generally treated as 
motions to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Federal Kemper Ins. 
Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Campbell v. Bartlett, 975 F.2d 1569, 1580 n.15 (10th Cir. 
1992). We therefore analyze McGlory's motion to reconsider, 
which was timely, as though he had filed it under Rule 
59(e). 
 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of one of the 
motions specified in Rule 4(a)(4)(A), including a Rule 59(e) 
motion, will become effective upon entry of the order 
disposing of the motion. Because McGlory filed his notice of 
appeal from the court's January 3, 1997 order while the 
Rule 59(e) motion was pending, the notice of appeal became 
effective on September 22, 1998 -- the date the District 
Court entered its order denying that motion. See  Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). However, in order to contest the denial 
of a Rule 59(e) motion, a new or amended notice of appeal 
must be filed. Thus, when the District Court denied 
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McGlory's Rule 59(e) motion on September 22, 1998, 
McGlory could proceed with his appeal of the January 3, 
1997 order denying his Rule 41(e) motion without further 
filing, but if he wanted the appeal to encompass any 
challenge to the order of September 22, 1998, he was 
required to file an amended notice of appeal. See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). He failed to do so. 
 
Patently, McGlory's original notice of appeal from the 
January 3, 1997 order could not confer jurisdiction over 
the District Court's September 22, 1998 order denying 
reconsideration. See United States v. Rivera Construction 
Co., 863 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1988) ("However, where the 
order or judgment upon which the appellant seeks review is 
neither directly nor indirectly referred to in the notice of 
appeal, then the issue is not fairly raised and the Court of 
Appeals does not acquire jurisdiction.") (internal quotation 
omitted). We therefore must limit our review to the merits 
of the January 3, 1997 order denying McGlory's Rule 41(e) 
motion. It follows that the District Court's disposition 
of certain issues (such as laches) in its Memorandum 
Order of September 22, 1998, adopting the Report and 
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, is not properly 
before us. 
 
II. 
 
The government states in its brief that "[t]he district court 
may have lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire 
claim." United States Brief at 19. As we understand the 
government's position, it is that jurisdiction may be lacking 
both because McGlory's challenge is to an administrative 
forfeiture and because McGlory's motion was filed after the 
completion of the underlying criminal proceedings. We have 
not previously considered whether a district court lacks 
jurisdiction over a Rule 41(e) motion on either of these 
grounds. 
 
Rule 41(e) provides: 
 
       A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure 
       or by the deprivation of property may move the district 
       court for the district in which the property was seized 
       for the return of the property on the ground that such 
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       person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. 
       The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact 
       necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion 
       is granted, the property shall be returned to the 
       movant. . . . 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e). 
 
McGlory's Rule 41(e) motion requested that the 
government return property seized from him and forfeited 
by the DEA in administrative and judicial proceedings,4 as 
well as property seized from him for which no forfeiture 
proceedings had been instituted and for which the 
government has failed to provide an accounting. 
 
The civil forfeiture of property that constitutes the 
proceeds of drug transactions is authorized by 21 U.S.C. 
S 881(a).5 When the seized property is $500,000 or less, the 
government may use the administrative forfeiture process 
governed by the customs laws; this process entails no 
judicial involvement. See 19 U.S.C. S 1607;6 21 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In this appeal, McGlory has not renewed his challenge to the notice 
provided in the judicial forfeiture proceedings, although that issue is 
before the court in the related appeals referred to in note 1 supra. 
 
5. Section 881(a) provides in pertinent part: 
 
       The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States 
and 
       no property right shall exist in them . . . 
 
       (6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things 
of 
       value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in 
       exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation 
of 
       this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and 
all 
       moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to 
       be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter. . . . 
 
6. Section 1607 provides: 
 
       If . . . the value of such seized vessel, vehicle, aircraft, 
merchandise, 
       or baggage does not exceed $500,000 [,]. . . the appropriate 
customs 
       officer shall cause a notice of the seizure of such articles and 
the 
       intention to forfeit and sell or otherwise dispose of the same 
       according to law to be published for at least three successive 
weeks 
       in such manner as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct. Written 
       notice of seizure together with information on the applicable 
       procedures shall be sent to each party who appears to have an 
       interest in the seized article. 
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S 881(d).7 The government is required to publish notice of 
its intent to forfeit the property once a week for three weeks 
and to send written notice to any party known to have an 
interest in the property. See 19 U.S.C.S 1607(a). If a 
claimant files a claim and a cost bond within 20 days after 
the first publication, the administrative process is halted 
and the seizing agency must turn the matter over to the 
United States Attorney to commence a judicial forfeiture 
proceeding, see 19 U.S.C. S 1608, which is the procedure 
automatically followed for property valued over $500,000. 
See 19 U.S.C. S 1610. If a claimant fails to file the bond to 
contest the forfeiture, the seizing agency will make a 
declaration of forfeiture and title will vest in the United 
States. See 19 U.S.C. S 1609(a). This administrative 
declaration has the same effect as a final decree and order 
of forfeiture entered in a judicial proceeding. See 19 U.S.C. 
S1609(b). 
 
A district court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to review the 
DEA's administrative forfeiture proceedings. See Linarez v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 212 (7th Cir. 
1993) ("[O]nce the government initiates an administrative 
forfeiture proceeding and the property is not the subject of 
an ongoing criminal proceeding, the district court loses 
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of return of property."). 
However, "the federal courts have universally upheld 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 881(d) states: 
 
       The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial 
       forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the 
customs 
       laws; the disposition of such property or the proceeds from the 
sale 
       thereof; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and the 
       compromise of claims shall apply to seizures and forfeitures 
       incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under any of the 
       provisions of this subchapter, insofar as applicable and not 
       inconsistent with the provisions hereof; except that such duties as 
       are imposed upon the customs officer or any other person with 
       respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property under the customs 
       laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of 
       property under this subchapter by such officers, agents, or other 
       persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the 
       Attorney General, except to the extent that such duties arise from 
       seizures and forfeitures effected by any customs officer. 
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jurisdiction to review whether an administrative forfeiture 
satisfied statutory and due process requirements." United 
States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing 
cases). 
 
Some courts have found equity jurisdiction appropriate to 
review a claimant's challenge to the sufficiency of the notice 
on the theory that a claimant who received inadequate 
notice lacked an adequate remedy at law. See United States 
v. Claggett, 3 F.3d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning 
that "[i]f notice of the pending forfeiture was inadequate, 
. . . then the forfeiture proceeding was never available to 
[the claimant] in any meaningful sense."); Sarit v. U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Admin., 987 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1993) 
("Whereas most challenges to forfeiture would be foreclosed 
by . . . failure to utilize [the statutory mechanism], courts 
have entertained challenges to the adequacy of notice, 
reasoning that the mechanism is not available to a plaintiff 
who is not properly notified of the pending forfeiture."). 
 
Further, those courts which have allowed limited judicial 
review of an administrative forfeiture proceeding on due 
process grounds have also ruled that a Rule 41(e) motion 
filed after criminal proceedings have terminated is an 
acceptable means of obtaining review. For example, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that"[w]here 
criminal proceedings against the movant have already been 
completed, a district court should treat a rule 41(e) motion 
as a civil complaint." United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 
511 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). Other 
courts have agreed. See Weng v. United States , 137 F.3d 
709, 711 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Clark, 
84 F.3d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Woodall, 12 F.3d 
at 794 n.1 (holding that a Rule 41(e) motion filed by a pro 
se plaintiff after criminal proceedings have ended should be 
liberally construed as seeking to invoke the proper remedy); 
United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that a district court has jurisdiction 
over a motion to return property styled as a Rule 41(e) 
motion, and should treat such motion as a civil equitable 
proceeding). 
 
We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive and now 
hold that a district court has jurisdiction to consider a 
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claim that a person received inadequate notice of completed 
administrative forfeiture proceedings, notwithstanding that 
the claim was styled as a Rule 41(e) motion andfiled after 
criminal proceedings had been completed. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction to 
consider McGlory's claim that he received inadequate notice 
of the DEA's administrative forfeiture proceedings. 
 
III. 
 
We thus turn to the narrow issue before us on this 
appeal: whether a pretrial detainee in custody of the 
Marshals Service has a due process right to have notice of 
administrative forfeiture proceedings mailed by the 
forfeiting agency directly to the pretrial detainee at the 
institution where s/he is being housed. The procedure 
followed by the DEA in this case, and apparently its general 
practice, was to mail a notice addressed to the detainee to 
or care of the Marshals Service at its office in the 
Pittsburgh courthouse, a practice that McGlory contends 
does not comport with due process. 
 
The government argues that due process was satisfied by 
sending the notices to the Marshals Service because under 
the Service's standard office procedure "any correspondence 
addressed to a person in custody . . . [was] forwarded . . . 
to the intended recipient, at his place of confinement, by 
first class mail, postage prepaid." Declaration of Gary 
Richards, Chief Deputy, United States Marshals Service, 
App. at 104. McGlory argues, in contrast, "that in order to 
satisfy constitutional requirements, the DEA was required 
to address the certified mail containing the notices to 
[McGlory] at the prison where the government was 
confining him." McGlory's Reply Br. at 7-8; see also 
McGlory's Opening Br. at 19-20.8 Thus the parties are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Because McGlory has not contended in his brief on this appeal that 
due process required more of the government than sending certified 
mail, return receipt requested, to him at his place of confinement, we are 
not faced with the issue before the court in United States v. Assorted 
Jewelry, No. 98-3579, namely, whether the government must ensure 
actual notice or take additional steps to increase the likelihood of 
actual 
notice, to prisoners in its custody. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Dep't of Public Welfare v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996) (argument not properly raised in brief 
is deemed waived on appeal). 
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joined on the issue whether the government has fulfilled its 
responsibility under the Due Process Clause to give 
reasonable notice under the circumstances by relying on 
the Marshals Service to forward notice to the detainee when 
the government, in whose custody the detainee is 
committed, is uniquely well situated to ascertain the 
detainee's whereabouts. 
 
The District Court did not meet this issue directly in its 
order of January 3, 1997, the only order properly before us, 
as it found that McGlory was personally served with notice 
of the administrative forfeitures. McGlory has consistently 
maintained that he was not personally served; further, even 
the government does not contend that McGlory was 
"personally served" (the language used by the District 
Court) by delivery to him. Although the DEA's notices were 
sent to the Marshals Service certified mail, return receipt 
requested, the Marshals Service allegedly remailed them by 
first class mail to McGlory at the prison where he was 
detained. As previously noted, the government has not 
produced any return receipts signed by McGlory. 
 
The statute governing administrative forfeitures requires, 
in addition to notice by publication, "[w]ritten notice . . . to 
each party who appears to have an interest in the seized 
article." 19 U.S.C. S 1607(a). That this notice must be one 
that satisfies the Due Process Clause is beyond 
peradventure. A half century ago, the Supreme Court 
declared that "[a]n elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to 
be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 
Twenty-three years later, in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 
U.S. 38 (1972), the Court addressed the question whether 
a notice of forfeiture, mailed to a prisoner's home address 
by the government entity in whose custody the prisoner 
was held, was constitutionally sufficient. In a brief, per 
curiam opinion, the Court, repeating the language from 
Mullane quoted above, held that it was not: 
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        In the instant case, the State knew that appellant 
       was not at the address to which the notice was mailed 
       and, moreover, knew also that appellant could not get 
       to that address since he was at that very time confined 
       in the Cook County jail. Under these circumstances, it 
       cannot be said that the State made any effort to 
       provide notice which was `reasonably calculated' to 
       apprise appellant of the pendency of the forfeiture 
       proceedings. 
 
Id. at 40. In so ruling, the Court suggested that the notice 
provided "with respect to an individual whose name and 
address are known or easily ascertainable," id., must be 
such notice that can be put to practical use. It cited its 
earlier decision in Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 
(1956), where it held that even mailing of a notice of 
foreclosure was inadequate if the individual involved was 
incompetent and without the protection of a guardian. 
Consistent with the principle enunciated in these cases, the 
Court stated in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 
U.S. 791, 800 (1983), that "[n]otice by mail or other means 
as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum 
constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will 
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party 
. . . if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable." 
(emphasis omitted). 
 
We took guidance from these cases in United States v. 
$184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995), 
a case involving an earlier set of forfeitures of other of 
McGlory's property. In that case, the government sent 
notices to McGlory's last known address but made no 
attempt to reach him at his place of confinement. We held 
this attempt inadequate under Robinson and Mennonite 
Board, stating, "McGlory argues, in our view persuasively, 
that Robinson and Adams together required that the 
government at least make an attempt to serve him with 
notice of the forfeiture proceedings in prison." Id. at 1163 
(emphasis added). Robinson alone should be dispositive of 
the issue in this case. 
 
The government cites no authority, and we are aware of 
none, that suggests that the forfeiting agency may delegate 
its responsibility by mailing notice to the Marshals Service 
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in Pittsburgh when the forfeiting agency is aware that the 
intended recipient is confined elsewhere. Even assuming 
arguendo that mailing the notices to the Marshals Service 
is more likely to reach the prisoner than mailing them to 
his last known address, the defect in $184,505.01, it is still 
inadequate when the government department or agency 
responsible for giving notice, here the DEA, knows or can 
quickly and easily obtain the place where the prisoner is 
confined. 
 
The constitutional imperative derived from Mullane and 
Robinson and their progeny plainly suggests that in order to 
give notice that meets the requirement of due process, the 
agency responsible for sending notice must, at least in the 
first instance, address and direct notice to the detainee at 
his place of confinement. This hardly imposes an onerous 
burden as the DEA did in fact mail notices to McGlory. Its 
deficiency was in not mailing them to McGlory's place of 
confinement. Rather than the two step process followed 
here, which entailed mailing McGlory's notices to the 
Marshals Service in Pittsburgh and relying on it to remail 
them to McGlory at the institution where he was then 
detained, the DEA could have ascertained McGlory's 
whereabouts at the relevant time from the Marshals Service 
(which acts as the locator for all persons in federal custody) 
and mailed its notices to him directly. 
 
It is not a novel proposition to hold that due process 
requires that notice to prisoners be directed and mailed to 
the prisoner where detained. Numerous decisions by other 
courts of appeals so hold. See, e.g., Weng v. United States, 
137 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Absent special justifying 
circumstances, the least that can be asked . . . is that [the 
forfeiting agency] determine where the claimant is detained 
and send the notice to the right institution."); United States 
v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1996) ("When the 
government is aware that an interested party is 
incarcerated, due process requires . . . an attempt to serve 
him with notice in prison."); Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. 
Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1161 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[I]f the DEA 
had desired to give [claimant] actual notification, a simple 
call to the Bureau of Prisons would have sufficed to reveal 
where [he] was serving his sentence."). Cf. United States v. 
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Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting due process challenge when notice was sent, inter 
alia, to institution where claimant was confined). 
 
The government also argues that because pretrial 
detainees are often moved between detention facilities and 
McGlory could have been moved after the DEA ascertained 
his whereabouts and sent the mail, "sending notice via the 
Marshals Service was the most reasonable and efficient 
means available for the DEA to provide McGlory with actual 
notice of its administrative actions." United States brief at 
23. Even if we assume that the Marshals Service actually 
followed its policy and remailed the notices, and the 
government introduced no such evidence, using the 
Marshals Service as a conduit for forfeiture notices may 
exacerbate rather than cure the problem it was designed to 
solve. McGlory could have been moved after the Marshals 
Service itself sent the mail. And adding the Marshals 
Service in the chain of mailers duplicates the number of 
agencies handing the mail, thereby increasing the 
possibility of error, and doubles the time until his receipt 
which is hardly a more reasonable attempt at service than 
mailing the notices directly to the detainee in thefirst 
place. 
 
There is no suggestion in this case that McGlory was 
moved about with such rapidity that it would not have been 
possible for mail to catch up with him. All of the 
administrative forfeiture notices at issue here were mailed 
between September 26 and November 15, 1989. What little 
record evidence there is suggests that McGlory was not 
moved during this time and that at least the U.S. Attorney's 
office knew where McGlory was for at least part of that 
time. See Case Information Reports filed by U.S. Attorney 
William Conley on October 4, 1989 and December 11, 
1989, listing McGlory's place of confinement as Hancock 
County Jail. 
 
Moreover, the DEA did not even make an attempt to 
reach him at his place of confinement, as we held was 
required in $184,505.01, 72 F.3d at 1163. Due process 
does not require an infallible method of giving notice. But 
before relying on the Marshals Service policy, which 
apparently failed in these six instances, the DEA had at 
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hand a method more "reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. As the 
Supreme Court in Mullane stressed, "when notice is a 
person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due 
process. The means employed must be such as one 
desirous of actually informing the absentee might 
reasonably adopt to accomplish it." 339 U.S. at 315. One 
who was "desirous of actually informing" McGlory would 
have taken the time to ascertain the easily ascertainable 
fact of his whereabouts and would, at the least, have 
directed the notices to him at that address."9 
 
We thus hold that, at a minimum, due process requires 
that when a person is in the government's custody and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. At oral argument, McGlory did not press the position that due process 
mandates the use of certified as opposed to ordinary first class mail. In 
fact, "[c]ertified mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary 
mail." United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual, Issue 54, 
S912.1.1 (12/2/1999) (on the Web at http://pe.usps.gov/). As the Postal 
Service explains, the principal advantage of this type of service is 
evidentiary. Id. ("Certified mail service provides the sender with a 
mailing 
receipt, and a delivery record is kept at the post office of address."). 
 
Although we have at times noted the obvious evidentiary value of 
certified or registered mail, we have not required notice to be effected 
in 
that manner. See, e.g., Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, 
P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 91-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (first class mail and publication 
provided adequate notice in class action suit); United States v. Smith, 
398 F.2d 173, 176-78 (3d Cir. 1968) (notice of divorce proceeding need 
not be sent by certified or registered mail); see also, e.g., DePiero v. 
City 
of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 788-89 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1999) (notice of right 
to contest parking ticket may be sent first class mail); Armendariz-Mata 
v. DEA, 82 F.3d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Under most circumstances, 
notice by ordinary mail is sufficient to discharge the government's due 
process obligations."); Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 650-51 
(2d Cir. 1988) (notice of tax foreclosure may be sent regular mail). Nor 
has the Supreme Court suggested a distinction of constitutional 
magnitude between these types of mail. See, e.g., Tulsa Prof 'l Collection 
Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988) ("notice by mail" 
sufficient 
to provide actual notice of probate proceedings); Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1950) (trust 
beneficiaries had to be notified "at least by ordinary mail" . . . which 
is 
"recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of communication"). 
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detained at a place of its choosing, notice of a pending 
administrative forfeiture proceeding must be mailed to the 
detainee at his or her place of confinement. Whether 
anything more is required is not presently before us in this 
appeal. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth we will vacate the District 
Court's order of January 3, 1997 granting summary 
judgment to the government with regard to DEA seizure 
numbers 52425, 65613, 65615, 66651, 65323 and 67065 
and remand to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We note that the District Court's order of January 3, 1997 did not 
address McGlory's claim to property he contends was seized but never 
subjected to administrative or judicial forfeiture, although McGlory did 
raise the issue in his Rule 41(e) motion. The Magistrate Judge's report 
of July 23, 1998, adopted by the District Court in its September 22, 
1998 order denying McGlory's motion for reconsideration, did address 
ten household items, and having determined that the government had 
properly accounted for all but two of the ten disputed items, determined 
that the government should return to McGlory a stereo system and 
camera which were seized but never forfeited or the value of these items. 
The status of the remaining twenty-six items that McGlory claims were 
also seized but not forfeited is not before us. The District Court may 
address them on remand. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I dissent from the judgment of the court and from part III 
of the court's opinion, which concerns the constitutionality 
of the notice of forfeiture that was provided in this case. I 
cannot agree with the majority's decision on this issue 
because it seems to me to be plainly inconsistent with the 
legal rule on which the majority purports to rely. According 
to the majority, "due process requires that when a person 
is in the government's custody and detained at a place of 
its choosing, notice of a pending administrative forfeiture 
must be mailed to the detainee at his or her place of 
confinement." Maj. Op. at 16-17. That is precisely what 
may well have happened in this case, and yet the 
majority holds that the manner in which notice was given 
here violated due process. 
 
In the majority's view, the following procedure should 
have been used. An employee of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (a component of the Department of Justice) 
should have ascertained from the United States Marshals 
Service (another component of the Department of Justice) 
where McGlory was held at the various times in question1 
and then sent the notices of forfeiture to McGlory at those 
locations by first-class mail. Instead, this is what 
happened. An employee of the DEA sent the notices to the 
Marshals Service, which had legal custody of McGlory, 
knew his exact location at all times, and has extensive 
experience and responsibilities relating to the service of 
process. The notices were received by the Marshals Service 
(the DEA produced certified mail receipts for all of the 
notices at issue), and, if the Marshals Service followed its 
standard practice, the Marshals Service forwarded the 
notices "to the intended recipient at his place of 
confinement, by first class mail, postage prepaid." App. at 
104. Indeed, the Chief Deputy Marshal for the Western 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At no time in this appeal has McGlory disputed the fact that he was 
moved from one facility to another during the relevant period. Indeed, in 
a submission filed shortly before the en banc argument, McGlory stated: 
"[T]he government saw fit to house Mr. McGlory while he was in their 
custody during this period at a number of state facilities which were 
apparently under contract with the federal government to house federal 
prisoners." Appellant's Oct. 25, 1999, Letter-Brief at 4 (emphasis added). 
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District of Pennsylvania affirmed that during the time in 
question "to the best of [his] knowledge and belief, the 
standard office procedures of the United States Marshal 
Service were followed, and all such correspondence was 
forwarded to Reginald D. McGlory at his place of 
confinement by first class mail, postage prepaid." Id. at 
105. Thus, if the Chief Deputy Marshal's belief and 
knowledge are correct and the standard practice of the 
Marshals Service was followed, notice of the forfeitures was 
mailed to McGlory at his place of confinement by first-class 
mail -- precisely what the majority says that due process 
demands. 
 
Why, then, does the majority think that due process was 
violated? The majority provides no express explanation. The 
majority opinion appears to hint at two possible 
explanations, but neither is supportable. First, the majority 
may believe that it is essential that the notice be sent to the 
detainee's place of confinement by "the forfeiting agency," 
Maj. Op. at 11, in this case the DEA, rather than the 
Marshals Service. Compare Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 
709, 715 (3d Cir. 1998)(treating the forfeiting agency, the 
DEA, and another component of the Justice Department, 
the Bureau of Prisons, as one entity for the purpose of due 
process notice requirements in administrative forfeiture of 
property of detainee). The majority, however, provides no 
reason for this requirement, and there is no constitutional 
basis for it. The forfeiture proceedings were brought in the 
name of the United States, and I fail to see why it matters 
for due process purposes whether the notices were mailed 
by a person working for the DEA or the Marshals Service. 
Suppose that the notices had been mailed by an employee 
of the United States Attorney's office or an employee of the 
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice in 
Washington. Would that make the notices constitutionally 
inadequate? 
 
The other possible ground for the majority's decision is 
internal Executive Branch efficiency. The majority opines 
that "adding the Marshals Service in the chain of mailers 
duplicates the number of agencies handling the mail, 
thereby increasing the possibility of error, and doubles the 
time until . . . receipt [by the detainee]." Maj. Op. at 15. But 
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even if this is true, it does not matter for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause. What matters for due process 
purposes is that notice is in fact mailed to the right place 
at the right time. If those requirements are met, any 
inefficiency in the internal government procedures leading 
up to the mailing is a matter for the Executive, not the 
Judiciary.2 
 
In sum, the en banc majority has rendered a decision 
that mailing by the Marshals Service, as opposed to the 
DEA, violates the Constitution, but the majority fails to say 
why, and no plausible explanation is apparent. I urge the 
majority to explain why it matters for due process purposes 
whether the notices were sent by the DEA or the Marshals 
Service. Since the majority has yet to offer such an 
explanation, and since none is apparent I would hold, 
contrary to the majority, that due process was satisfied in 
this case -- provided that the Marshals Service followed its 
standard practice and sent the notices in question to 
McGlory by first-class mail at his place or places of 
confinement. It is far from clear that McGlory has raised on 
appeal the argument that in fact the Marshals Service did 
not follow its standard practice with respect to the notices 
in question,3 but I would give him the benefit of the doubt 
on this point and remand for a factual finding by the 
District Court. If the District Court finds that the Marshals 
Service never sent the notices, I would agree with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The majority's suggestion that its decision is supported by Robinson v. 
Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972), and United States v. $184,505.01, 72 
F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995), is plainly incorrect. Both cases held that due 
process was violated where notice of forfeiture was sent to the home 
address of a person who was incarcerated, rather than the place where 
he was being held, even though the government knew that the detainee 
was in custody. Neither case had anything to do with the issue 
presented here, viz., whether due process was violated because the DEA, 
instead of mailing the forfeiture notices directly to McGlory's place of 
confinement, mailed them to the Marshals Service, and the Marshals 
Service, if it followed its standard practice, then forwarded them to 
McGlory. 
 
3. Rather, the main thrust of McGlory's argument, like the majority's 
analysis, focuses on the conduct of the DEA, and he contends that the 
DEA's actions -- mailing the notices to the Marshals Service -- were 
constitutionally inadequate. 
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majority that due process was not provided. But if the 
Court finds that the Marshals Service did send the notices, 
I would hold that due process was satisfied. 
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